Experimental Psychology in ancient China: Gongsun Longzi and the School of Names

Different from Confucianism and Taoism, which received massive respect and are hailed throughout Chinese history, the case of the School of Names (名家) is very different. The School of Names, which was believed to be founded by Hui Shi (惠施), was usually regarded as a rival to Taoism (which was depicted in the book of Zhuangzi 莊子). Even worse, the School of Names was lowly regarded as a group of sophists that focused only on trivial matters.

This could be found in the ancient commentary to the famous debate between the school of names and late Moism (後期墨家) on the proposition of “White Horse” is not “horse”(白馬非馬) (translator’s note: due to the difference between Chinese and English language, the article and plural forms are deliberately omitted in this translation). It was often regarded by other schools of thought in ancient China as a meaningless argument. For example, in chapter Reserving power I part 1 in Han Feizi (韓非子‧外儲說左上), Han Fei (韓非, 280-233 BC) mentioned a story about a debater called Er Shuo (兒說). Han Fei mentioned, “Er Shuo, who was a famous sophist, was born in the Sung Kingdom (宋). He was famous in his exposition of “White Horse” is not “horse”, which was acclaimed by debaters in the Academy of the Gate of Chi in Qi Kingdom (齊國稷下學宮). One day, he rode a white horse and passed the border, no matter how vehemently he argued that “White Horse” is not “horse”, he was ordered to pay the entry tax for his white horse as required.” Han Fei lamented, “Therefore, even those meaningless arguments could win whole country’s debaters’ attention, it could not fool a single person, who judges by facts and reality. (…兒說，宋人，善辯者也。持白馬非馬也服齊稷下之辯者，乘白馬而過關，則顧白馬之賦。故籍之虛辭則能勝一國，考實按形不能謾於一人…)” Han Fei wrote this story as a satire to devaluate the School of Names.

In chapter The World (天下) in Zhuang Zi (莊子), there was a direct condemnation of Gongsun Long (公孫龍, 320-250 B.C., the most important figure in the School of Names) for attempting to hit the straw man, yet they could not really persuade anyone. This is evident in the following commentaries: “Huan Tuan (桓團, ?-?) and Gongsun Long were sophists. They fabricated others’ intention and swiftly changed the meaning of one’s saying. The problem is that they could only make one feel speechless, but they could not convince people ( …桓團、公孫龍辯者之徒，飾人之心，易人之意，能勝人之口，不能服人之心，辯者之囿也…).”

Even in recent eras, the public image of the School of Names as a group of sophists still prevails, preventing us from realizing that the content of the book Gongsun Longzi (公孫龍子) is way ahead of its time. The author of this article even regard Gongsun Longzi as a landmark in Chinese intellectual history.

There are different definitions of the School of Names. There are some commonalities among these perspectives: First, the School of Names is originated by Hui Shi (惠施, 380-305 BC). Hui Shi raised some propositions – very often these are seemingly paradoxes. Those who participates in the debates need to propose new theories or expositions to build upon those propositions. Second, these propositions are usually not related to politics or ethics, but usually related to abstract forms. Lastly, those who were categorized as “sophists” (in Chinese Bianzhe 辯者, literally means debaters, is always negatively put in Zhuangzi) actually shared different academic interests. For example, it was mentioned in In chapter The World in Zhuangzi that a scholar called Huang Liao (黃繚, ? - ?) discussed with Hui Shi on astrology, geography, and proposed the theories about formation of the universe. This was very different from the research interest of late-Moism and Gongsun Long, whose interest were focusing on formal logic (late-Moism) and psycholinguistics (Gongsun Long).

Gongsun Long (公孫龍) is the most prominent figure in late school of names. In fact, the origin of the name could be traced back to the chapter Language and Reality (Ming-shi, 名實) in Gongsun Longzi (here the Chinese character Ming, 名, could be translated as names, though the content of the chapter is actually about language).

Among the five existing academic chapters in Gongsun Longzi (note: Given that the Chapter Biography Jifu, 跡府 is a collection of anecdotes not written by Gongsun Long himself, this article would focus on the remaining five chapters), we could easily find the inheritance to Hui Shi’s propositions, including “Chicken has three feet” （雞三足）and “yellow horse and cow with patches of colours yields three＂(黃馬、驪牛三). Furthermore, propositions included in Gongsun Longzi such as “White Horse” is not “horse” (白馬非馬, translator’s note: due to differences in grammar, the author deliberately makes a translation that is seemingly different from English to display the flexibility in Chinese language), “hardness, whiteness, and stony are three different qualities” (堅白石三) revealed areas including psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology. The position of the School of Names were against the rival school of late-Moism, which revealed their stance in naturalism and realism in their encyclopaedia The Script (Jing, 經) and Annotation to the Script (Jingshuo, 經說). 

We could see how profound are their arguments in the area of psychology in chapter Hardness and Whiteness (Jian Bai 堅白) in Gongsun Longzi. In Annotation to the script part two (經說下), Moist believed that foundation of human vision came from the external world. The prerequisite of vision is light (in the text they adopt the character Huo (火), which literally means fire but also implies light). Moist proposed that our eyes could see the lights, but lights are not necessarily to be seen unless we have normal and functional sense organs. Therefore, they concluded that sensation is the prerequisite to vision, though we often thought that it is due to external lights that one could see (智：以目見。而目以火見，而火不見). (Translator’s note: the character Zhi 智 here also means wisdom in Chinese language, but in Moist text it usually refers to sensation). Here Moist wanted to propose a theory on sensation and its relationship with external stimulus (light/fire), and their contribution had already been way ahead of its time of warring states, which emerged two thousand and four hundred years from now.

However, Gongsun Long proposed new theories and provided empirical evidence to pinpoint the problems of Moist theories. He adopted the phenomenon of afterimage to argue that even the source of light (fire) was removed, we could still see the afterimage. Therefore, our conscious allows us to create sensation (perception) even when stimulus does not exist. Furthermore, there might be an area that is even deeper than the consciousness (Shen, 神), Gongsun Long named this as “Tianxia 天下”, which means the horizon (The original text is目以火見，而火不見。則火與目不見而神見。神不見，而見離).

On the other hand, sometimes even external stimuli were present, we could not sense it. Gongsun Long even provided an example of reflex action as evidence. He mentioned the arm reflex (While the arm is hit with a hammer, the hammer is supposed to trigger sensation which is not found here, thus the consciousness is not aware of it. (而手以捶，是捶與手知而不知，而神與不知). Gongsun Long termed this phenomena as “li” (離, dissociated) (“in this sense, the consciousness is dissociated”, 神乎，是之謂離焉). Therefore, with the presence of external stimuli, sometimes we could make direct response without involvement of consciousness.

Therefore, Gongsun Long provided two opposite scenarios, the first is that one could still hold the sensation even external stimulus is removed, the second is that the stimulus exists yet we skip the consciousness and respond with direct reflex action. In this way, Gongsun Long elaborated the differences among perception, sensation, and reflex, and suggested that our consciousness could be dissociated. All of the above arguments were actually in the scope of modern psychology. From the perspective of history of psychology, these are the earliest texts that systematically investigated afterimages and reflexes.

Apart from the above-mentioned excerpt from the chapter Hardness and Whiteness, there are many important and profound contributions to psychology in Gongsun Longzi. For example, while we categorize white horse as a subcategory of horse, in daily language, when we talk about “white” in “White Horse”, we emphasize the connotation of “white” more than “horse”, therefore we have new extended associations and new meanings, such as “rare, noble, treasure…”. Therefore, from Linguistic point of view, these two words (white horse, horse) serve different functions, therefore, “White Horse” is not “horse”. This new perspective from psycholinguistics complemented the Moist perspective of realism and extended their ideas based on biology (Moist insisted that white horse is a horse).

Contemporary scholars in Chinese philosophy have become more aware of the significance of the contents in Gongsun Longzi and are gradually abandoning previous stereotype of the School of Names as sophists. As the significance of the School of Names is being more recognized, it is anticipated that in the forthcoming future, the deciphering of the text in Gongsun Longzi and The Script (Jing, 經) and Annotation to the Script (Jingshuo, 經說) of late Moism would reveal the significance of their debates in history of ideas in China. In doing so, we could juxtapose these developments with modern theories so that we could extend their dialogues in modern era. This is a way to sustain and revitalize our cultural traditions and ancient philosophy.